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Legal and Regulatory Framework for the Mortgage
Industry In Nigeria
Mr. ]. A. Akinwale*

I.

Introduction

The business of a mortgage institution is relatively straightforward; its basic tools of
mobilising savings and granting loans (mortgages) arc comparatively simple concepts,
though operating in a highly competitive money market. A mortgage institution is
basically a service organisation, which requires a dynamic marketing organisation and
effective system of financial control, in order to record appreciable growth. It has also
to service the accounts of its investors and borrowers. Servicing those accounts
requires a large volume of administrative work.
While mortgage institutions are primarily concerned with human relations, both in
their mortgage and selling (savings/ deposit mobilisation) operations with their
customers, and in the management of their staff. It is, therefore, important to note that
the legal and regulatory framework for the mortgage industry sets the form, scope and
structure of the housing finance system and provides for its safe and sound ope.ration.
The outline of major issues on legal and regulatory framework for mortgage
institutions, which will be discussed in this presentation include: Functions of PMis
vis-a-vis their enabling laws and role in the overall financial system; Licensing; Assets
and Liability Powers; Capital Requirements; Supervision; Disclosure and Verification
of Information; Staffing, and Developmental Issues.

II.

Brief Historical Background of Primary Mortgage
Institutions in Nigeria

The emergence of privately owned PMis followed the promulgation of the Mortgage
Institutions Decree No. 53 of 1989, which provided the legal framework for the
establishment of such institutions. PMis are expected to fulfil a purpose: to provide a
• Mr. ]. A. Akinwa/e is the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer, Jim/ands Nigeria Limited (Housing
Finance Consulting Services Company).
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safe and convenient means of saving for the general public, and, to a limited extent, for
various corporate and unincorporated bodies. Furthermore, they are to use the funds
to make loans on mortgages, primarily to those who wish to buy or build their own
homes. PMis have been in the Nigerian financial system for more than a decade. In the
early 1990s, many primary mortgage institutions were licensed by the Federal
Mortgage Bank of Nigeria. The first set of primary mortgage institutions were actually
licensed in 1991. By 1993, the number had grown to over 260. The financial system
distress of the early 1990s affected the PMis in no small way. Many of the PMis failed
and eventually, 97 had their licences revoked byFMBN in 1995. By the time the Central
Bank of Nigeria took over the supervision of PMis in 1997, less than 120 PM Is could be
regarded as still in operation. Today, less than 100 PMls are in operation.
The early PMis had gone into business without observing any of the tenets of financial
planning and control. In fact, it was discovered that most promoters of PM!s had very
little knowledge of what mortgage business was all about. Some promoters had the
intention of fmding an easy way of entering the banking industry but without any
regard for the s pecialised nature of the mortgage business which PMis are licen sed to
operate. A few other promoters even thought that the National Housing Fund scheme
was another form of funding mechanism that would be allocating funds to the PMis
without any cons_ideration for underwriting principles. Such misconceptions led to
the early collapse of many PMis. This re-emphasises the need to have a clear
understanding and knowledge of the business of mortgage finance in all its
ramifications

m.

Functions of Mortgage Institutions

Housing finance, which is the centrepiece of the National Housing Policy (NHP)
document launched in 1991, is in the form of a two-tier arrangement with the Federal
Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) as the apex mortgage ins titution on the one hand,
and the multiplicity of primary mortgage institutions (PMis) on the other hand. FMBN
is charged with the responsibility of managing and administering the National
Housing Fund (NHF), among others. The National Housing Fund is another creation of
the NHP with the objective of ensuring continuous flow of financial resources into
housing development. Resources of the Fund are channelled through PMis for on lending to individual contributors to the Fund.
The enabling law from which primary mortgage institutions (PMls) derive their
functions are the Mortgage Institutions Act (No. 53 of 1989), Banks and Other Financial

Akimvale

33

Institutions Act (as amended) as well as Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Guidelines to
Mortgage Institutions. The major functions of mobilising savings and deposits from
the public and lending such financial resources mobilised for housing are guided by
these laws and guidelines.
The powers for carrying out mortgage business are outlined in the CBN Guidelines to
Mortgage Institutions (as amended). The Guidelines show that primary mortgage
institutions (PMis) are granted powers to:
a.
grant loans or advances to any person for the building, improvement or
extension of a dwelling/commercial house;
b.
grant loans and advances to any person for the purchase or
construction ofa dwelling/commercial house;
c.
accept savings and deposits from the public and payment of interest
thereon;
d.
manage pension funds/ schemes;
e.
offer technical advisory services for the purchase or construction of a
dwelling house;
f
perform estate management duties;
g.
offer project consultancy services for estate development;
h.
engage in estate development through loan syndication, subject to the
restriction imposed by the shareholders' funds unimpaired by losses;
i.
engage in property trading including land acquisition and disposal;
j.
engage in other activities which the Bank may approve from time to
time.

IV.

licensing

Competition is desirable in an integrated financial system, but unlike most other
industries, finance is "affected with a public interest". It is not in the public interest
for any financial institution to fail. Failure and insolvency impose no·t only financial
losses but undermine the trust and confidence in financial institutions that individual
households and businesses must have, to serve the course of economic development.
The licensing function of a regulatory institution in the industry should be designed to
ensure that a sufficient number of primary mortgage institutions exist to meet the
housing finance need s of the community. That function also has to ensure that
licences are not granted so freely that the market becomes "overbanked". For
e,xample, if the housing finance market in Nigeria can only sustain 30 to 50 PMis
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operating safely, soundly and profitably, the CB must not grant licences for 100 or
more because some of them will ultimately fail. Market size considerations are not, by
any means, the only thing with which the regulatory authority mus t be concerned. In
considering an application for licence, the regulatory body must satisfy itself that the
founders have sufficient capital to commence operations and have recru ited capable
and experienced management and staff to operate competently and hones tly. The
authority also has to ens ure that the PMis to be licensed not only meet the Ucensing
requirements when applying for the licence but also m eet these requiremen ts on a
continuous basis.

V.

Asset and liability Powers

A primary mortgage ins titution (PMI) must operate within the scope of the general law
and guidelines governing mortgage business. The asset and liability powers of the
financial institution are the essence of the s tructure of the system and, to a significant
extent, constitute the definition of the market served by the institution. The range of
choices open to the law in structuring the mortgage industry can be varied. For the
Nigerian mortgage industry, the ins titutional form selected is deposit based. However,
there are a number of pertinent questions that readily comes to mind. Such questions
include: 'Is a PMI allowed to accept deposits from any person, enterprise or
governmental entity? Or is it limited to accepting deposits from the household sector
only? What kind of deposits are allowed and whether the deposits arc subject to
withdrawal on demand at short notice? Or may it also issue time deposits which may
not be withdrawn be fore maturity without penalty? Can it offer demand (sight)
deposits subject to withdrawal by cheque? Can it issue long-term bonds and preferred
s tock? May it establish small-denomination mutual funds based on participants in its
mortgage portfolio? May it issue obligations denominated in foreign currency? If the
law and/or the regulations are silent on these issues, then it may be presumed that the
PMI is permitted to draw funds from whatever source it can, using whatever
instrument it can devise to do so; in this case, the market for the PM! is broad indeed.
The way in which the liability powers of the institution are defined by law and
regulation should significantly affect the capital requirem ents of the ins titution, the
level of management and staff expertise required for safe, sound and profitable
operation as well as the kind of regulations imposed on it to assure prudential
administration of the public's funds.
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Similar considerations apply on the asset side. Will the institution be allowed to invest
only in liquid instruments (cash, deposits in other financial institutions, government
securities) and home mortgages? May the institution make loans to households for
consumption as well as housing investment? May it also provide construction
financing to developers and lines of credit to building materials manufacturers and
suppliers? Will the institution be permitted to take an equity position in housing
projects or building materials industries, operate a real estate agency, provide life and
hazard insurance to mortgagors? Wh at kind of instruments may it use to make home
mortgage Joans? Must the instruments be fixed-rate amortising loans or may it also
use a variety of adjustable-rate or line-of-credit mortgages? It should be noted that
some of these issues have somehow been addressed in the CBN Guidelines to PMis.
Again, if those not addressed in the Guidelines are also not addressed in the law, it may
be presumed that the mortgage institutions implicitly have all powers not explicitly
denied it.
In general, it will prove preferable to limit the scope of asset and liability powers of
mortgage institutions for several reasons. First, the broader the asset and liability
powers, the greater the burden on management to become expert in a variety of fields
and the greater the burden on the regulators to formulate and administer regulations
prescribing prudential investment of the public funds. At least in the early stages of
development of a housing finance system, the supply of managerial talent may be in
short supply, as is currently being witnessed in the industry, with the consequence
that if the institutions attempt to utilise all of the broad powers granted to them, they
will exp erience losses in at least some lines of business.
Second, some of these lines of business may already be well-served by other financial
institutions. Commercial banks, for example, may be willing and able to supply
adequate financing to real estate developers and building materials suppliers. The
policy choice of whether or not to grant such asset powers to mortgage institutions
then turns to whether their competition with commercial banks will be healthy for the
entire financial system or not and to whether housing finance institutions need the
portfolio diversification for interest-rate risk management purposes. Similar
considerations apply to granting hazard insurance powers to mortgage institutions.
Are the country's casualty insurers willing and able to supply such insurance on
reasonable terms? If not, granting this power to mortgage institutions may stimulate
casualty insurers to expand their Hnes of insurance and/ or offer more reasonable
terms.
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Third, potential conflicts of interest should be avoided in the legal and regulatory
structure. If the mortgage institution is to provide all the construction and mortgage
financing, should it also be allowed to take an equity position in the project it finances,
appraise the value of the project and take a commission through its real estate agency
for the sale of the units? One of the key functions of the financial system is to say "no"
to loans and projects that are not creditworthy. A mortgage institution will be in a
better position to perform this important function if it does not have a conflicting
financial interest in the project. Similar considerations apply to insurance functions,
real estate agency and appraisal.
Within the scope of the housing finance function, however, it is pro.'ably preferable to
allow the institution relatively wide latitude in shaping the instruments it uses to
mobilise savings and convey mortgage loans. As a housing finance specialist, the PMI
is in a better position than the law-makers and regulators to detect changes in market
conditions and to determine what innovations in instrument design are likely to work
and which ones are not.
1n the final analysis, the legal and regulatory framework should seek to provide a

structure that will give the mortgage institution a reasonable opportunity to manage
its credit and interest-rate risks. At the same time, the framework should make
provision for ensuring that the opportunity for conflicts of interest are not present in
the law, that the competition with other types of financial institutions implied by
overlapping asset and liability powers increases the efficiency of the relevant market
without unduly impairing the safety and soundness of the operation of any of the
institutions. Finally, once these issues are decided, the regulators must be given
adequate resources and powers to ensure that all financial system operations are
conducted in accordance with the law and that the institutions are managed
prudently.

VI.

Capital Requirements

The establishment and maintenance of capital requirements is a crucial element of the
legal and regulatory system. The mortgage institution's capital, whether it is a public
or a private sector institution, is the first line of defence against impairment of the
institution's ability to fulfil its obligations to creditors. The Basie Accord established
an international system of risk-based minimum capital requirements for financial
institutions. The CBN is a regular participant at the Basie Accord formulations and has
adopted the system in assessing capital adequacy of financial institutions. The CBN
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has established guidelines for minimum capital requirement, expressed as a
percentage of assets, regardless of the range of risks to which the institutions are
exposed. Conceptually, as well as practically, the single capital requirement will leave
conservatively-managed, risk-averse institutions "over-capitalised" and other, more
aggressive institutions "under-capitalised". Correcting these discrepancies in capital
adequacy is a principal virtue of risk-based capital requirements.
No doubt there are variety of ways in which a risk-based capital requirement might be
constructed. The Basie system, however, was the subject of long and careful study and
may be presumed that, for the time b eing, represents the state of the art. The Basie
system requires each institution subject to the requirement to satisfy two "leverage"
ratios. The first sets minimum capital (Tier 1) equal to-! per cent of the institution's
assets even if those assets consist entirely of riskless assets (e.g. cash). The second
leverage ratio (Tier 2) is 8 per cent, including Tier 1 capital, incorporates a scheme of
risk-weights to determine the precise amount of required capital and allows a wider
definition of capital in meeting the Tier 2 capital requirement.
There is, of course, nothing sacrosanct about the 8 per cent leverage ratio of the Basie
Accord. The CBN might choose to require a higher leverage ratio 10 per cent or 12 per
cent - and achieve higher degree of protection against credit risk while maintaining the
same, or a similar, risk-weighting as the Basie system.
However, the leverage ratio chosen should depend significantly on at least three
factors:

•

•
•

the breadth of the asset powers accorded to the mortgage institutions,
the actual risk experienced in various categories of lending, and
the perceived strength of the supervisory system.

Broad asset powers, poor historical experience with loan delinquencies and defaults,
and a weak supervisory system all argue in favour of leverage ratios higher than those
of the Basie system. A "high" capital requirement is not, of course, a substitute for
adequate supervision. While capital requirements discourage financial institution
management from "rolling the dice" with the deJ~ J,~rs' fun?,s , no fractional (less
than 100 per cent) capital requirement alone can ensure that financial institutions
strictly observe sound underwriting and prudential lending practices.
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Supervision

The legal and regulatory framework put in place for the housing finance system is
designed to promote the development of the system. The regulatory authority will no
doubt be operating within a framework, which has three major objectives:
i)
ii)

iii) •

to assure compliance with the regulations;
to ensure that PMis are being managed prudently; and
to provide information to Government on an on-going basis about the
adequacy and appropriateness of regulations as the housing finance
market change and evolve.

In pursuing these obj ectives, the supervisory agency (CBN) requires periodic reports
on financial conditions submitted by the regulated financial institutions and
information obtained from on-site examinations (or inspections) of the institutions.
The periodic reports (no less frequently than quarterly) should serve as an earlywarning system for the regulator. These reports should, at a minimum, disclose the
full balance sheet and income (profit and loss) statement of the institution and all
current loan delinquencies and defaults. The supervisory agency is then able to
determine the degree of the institution's current compliance with minimum
prescribed ratios and "track" changes in the condition of each institution over time by
comparing current reports with previous reports.

To ensure that the information it receives is accurate, "on-site" examinations must be
part of the supervisory programme. Each institution should be examined at least once
during a legally-prescribed period, say, two years. The CBN has the authority to
examine an institution more frequ ently, if necessary. In general, institutions that did
not "score" well on previous examinations should be e,xamined more frequently. Onsite examinations include determination of regulatory compliance, but are
distinguished from off-site supervision by their attention to the adequacy of
accounting procedures, underwriting procedures, documentation of loan files,
management information systems, internal controls, risk management procedures,
classification of loans and provisioning for loan losses. On-site examinations
frequently turn up problemlteas of the institution's operations that cannot be
ascertained from periodic reports.
Existing laws and regulation permit e,xaminers to request financial institutions to
make appropriate provisions for loan losses, classify assets as non-p erforming and
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write off uncollectible loans. The laws and regulations of the mortgage industry also
provide penalties for non-compliance with regulations, submission of inaccurate,
misleading or falsified reports. There are a range of actions which can be taken to
enforce compliance.
Penalties should, of course, be tailored to suit the regulatory violation and may include
fines, "cease and desist" orders, removal of managers and/ or directors, civil and/ or
criminal referrals to prosecute managers and/ or directors for illegal actions or wilful
violation of prudential regulations. The CBN has the authority to close an insolvent
institution. When this course of action is taken, the CB also exercises its discretion to
liquidate the institution or to restructure it by dissolving the shareholders' interests
and merging the institution with another (healthy) institution, in the process taking
whatever action may be necessary to facilitate the merger. Such powers are exercised
in collaboration with the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) in the case of
commercial banks. This will also be possible when NDIC assumes insurance of
deposits in mortgage institutions.

VIII. Development Issues
The National Housing Fund
With the launching in 1991 of the National Housing Policy, which provided for a twotier mortgage finance system, the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria was
deconsolidated in 1993 and made the Apex Mortgage Institution. The FMBN was then
assigned new roles of licensing, supervising and monitoring of primary mortgage
institutions, which are supposed to mobilise savings in the economy and use it for
creating mortgages. The Bank (FMBN) was also given the additional role of mobilising
cheap funds into the National Housing Fund (NHF) Scheme. It is to manage and
disburse these funds as loans to individual contributors through PMis. Through its
supervisory role, the Bank was to ensure that the PMis disburse these loans in
accordance with the National Housing Fund Act 1992, which set up the Fund.
However, following the transfer of the supervisory role of PMis to the Central Bank of
Nigeria in 1997, the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria now has sole responsibility of
managing the National Housing Fund. FMBN has thus been relieved of the burden to
supervise and monitor the operations of the PMis. On the other hand, FMBN still
prescribes regulations and conditions for the operations of the National Housing Fund
under which primary mortgage institutions are major players and still have to relate to
FMBN for accessing the Fund facilities.
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Ade quacy of Capital
The es tablishment and maintenance of capita l requirem en ts is a crucial element of the
legal and regula tory system. It was mentioned earlier that the PMl's capital is the first
Une of de fence agains t impairme nt of the ins titution's ability to fulfil its obligations to
depositors and other creditors. A minimum capital requirement would need to be
maintained, regardless of the range o f ris ks to which the PMis are exposed.

Primary mortgage ins titutions had entered the hou sing finance m arket in J 99 1 with a
minimum paid up s hare capital of NS million. The minimum paid-up s hare capital for
PMis was later in 1995 increased to N20 mjllion. Most wa tchers of the mortgage
industry agreed that the capital prescription was grossly inadequate, given the cost of
building or buying residential houses where the onl y source of finan ce for home
ownersrup is through PMls. Where the average cost of building or buying a house is
about N S million, the number of individual mortgagors a PM! can accommoda te will be
dependent on the level o f its capital and how successful it has been in mobilising longterm funds. Trus informed the prescription by the Central Bank of Nigeria that PM!s
increase their minimum p aid up sha re capital from N 20 million to ii-H OO million. The
Central Bank of Nigeria is already discussing with stakeholders within the mortgage
industry with a view to arriving at a more appropriate and adequate capital
prescription for mortgage institutions. The PMls trade association - the Mortgage
Banking Association of igeria (MBA ) is already sending feelers to its members in this
regard. The minimum paid-up s hare capital being considered is between Nl billion
and N2 billion.

IX.

Suggestions for Improving Mortgage Lending in Nigeria

Given the performance to date and the direction articulated in the ational Housing
Policy launched in 1991 and the new one j us t approved by Government, there ar e some
iss ues and factors wruch bear on the effectiveness of the housing finance system over
the medium- to long-term. Some of the major issues and sugges tions for further
improvements are highligh ted as follows;
•

•

Housing finance is as m uch abou t resource mobilisation as it is about
econ omic growth; unless ther e is an appreciable level of savings at
affordable cos t and witrun an appropriate ins titutional framework,
lending, for whatever purp ose, may be constr ained.
Withou t an assurance of liqwdity for long term paper, private capital
m ay not voluntarily flow into the housing sector; h en ce, a secondary
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lending mechanism is a sine qua non for growth of the housing
finance system.
High cost of construction is not conducive to the growth of mortgage
lending; it follows that the lower the cost of construction, the higher
the potential for both the expansion of mortgage lending and the
multiplier effects on the economy.

In the light of the issues highlighted above, there arc three strategic objectives that
must be targets of future housing finance system. The targets stem from basic
imperatives that an effective housing finance system must satisfy namely: to facilitate
access to loans for households across a wide spectrum of income groups; to encourage
the private sector to invest in housing finance; and to enhance the macroeconomic
impact of housing finance services. These targets are examined in the ensuing
paragraphs.
Increased Flow of Long-term Funds

The first object must be to secure an increased (and a regular) flow of long-term funds
into the system. Urbanisation is an irreversible phenomenon; and it is most likely to
remain the source of the bulk of demand for housing finance services. As the ruralurban drift continues, and as life-styles in the rural areas change for the better, so is
the demand expected to grow. A concomitant issue is the absolute growth of
population. The consequence has been the overcrowding conditions in most of our
urban areas. This poses two challenges: how to satisfy the current backlog in housing
services, and how to sustain the momentum.
We can draw some comfort from the fact that the NHF exists to inject new low cost
loanable resources into the system on a continuous basis; such additions to the
operational reflows from the existing loanable pool will serve to swell the lending base.
But we should not be lulled into a false sense of security. The Fund is essentially to
augment the savings, which the PMis are expected to mobilise from households, and to
provide a liquidity mechanism for the l savings. Indeed, mobilisation of voluntary
savings remains the platform for retail lending by PMis. Hence, unless these
intermediate institutions can perceive their role as leaders in the mobilisation of
voluntary savings, rather than as mere conduits for NHF proceeds, the full
development of the housing finance system may become a mirage; and the Fund could
become overwhelmed by excess demand.
Over the short-to-medium-term, the systemic illiquidity within the financial
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ins titutions could also create its own constraints on the HF. Individuals, who arc
unable to procure loans from the commercial banking system could have recourse to
the HF. The not-so-high income groups might feel a sense of being crowded out of
the lending system.
Strengthening the Primary Mortgage Market
Th e second objective should be to strengthen and expand the primary mortgage
market through the consolidation and improvement of the operations of the PM!s.
Mere regulatory without adequate supervisory surveillance of the system, including
the power to sanction, could turn out to be a costly and ultimately self-defeating
response. Restoring investors' confidence demand that standards of transactions be
homogenised. ln that regard, standardisation must be regarded a pre-requisite for the
primary lenders to make their operations comparable to one another.

The NHF is a veritable mechanism for organising the primary market, since it is
expected to operate on a uniform set of criteria, which every intermediate lending
institution must comply with. In this regard, the double advantage in the coincidence
of institutional responsibilities for the regulation and supervision of mortgage
operations under a separ ate Mortgage Institutions law as well as the management and
administration by FMBN of the HF could have been sustained. That was the case until
1997 when th e Central Bank of Nigeria took over the supervision and control of PMls.
The FMBN was responsible for the definition of both the operating standards for PMis
and the criteria for NHF loans. The then convergence of r esponsibilities was meant to
facilitate the rationalisation of operations within the market. As of now, FMB is left
with the setting o f guidelines and standards for operations of HF lending scheme.
Creating a Secondary Mortgage Market
The primary roles of government are to create, maintain and s upport the legal and
institutional system n ecessary for a viable housing finance system. Such enabling
environment will make it possible to attract long-term capital to h ousing finance. The
creation of a national mortgage market and, ultimately, a secondary market, requires
that all mortgage originators (PMis) adhere to similar property and credit underwriting
standards. The standard b eing established for the operation of the National Housing
Fund loan Scheme is a pointer in this direction.

The existence of a stock exchange in Nigeria is an ins titutional infrastructure for
securitising whole mortgages, managing mortgage pools and trading mortgagebacked securities on the open market. The existen ce of an active stock exchange and a
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bond market is a necessary condition for a secondary market in whole mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities, but there are other important considerations to be taken
into account. Perhaps the most important of these is the volume likely to be generated
in the mortgage-backed securities market. Security issuance is a more efficient way of
raising funds than individual loan sales. A secondary mortgage facility may be able to
issue longer maturity bonds than individual institutions. If the institution is well
capitalised and supported by Government, as being proposed for Federal Mortgage
Bank of Nigeria, it can achieve a higher credit rating and lower cost of funding for its
activities than private issuers. FMBN may be able to issue securities with lower
transactions costs. Issuance of a large volume of standardised securities can result in
greater liquidity than issues of individual institutions. Cost efficiencies for the
housing finance system can only be achieved with a large flow of resources at very
little cost.
Evolution of Domestic Construction Technology
The third objective is the need for the evolution of a culture of domesticated
construction technology as an imperative for the expansion of the housing finance
system. Prevailing construction standards have generally resulted in high costs. This,
understandably, is both in response to planning regulations and due to the
preferences of developers/ planning standards for better environmental quality, and
the quest for higher profit margin by the developers. But the reality is that, standards
or no standards, the low-incom e earners still go ahead to build what they can afford
even if it is outside the planning regulations; and this results in more illegal
development. Every such illegal development is a loss of potential patronage for the
housing finance system and an addition to the statistics of non-conforming
developments in our urban areas.

With a judicious review of construction standards through policies that encourage the
use of locally available building materials, a larger cross-section of the socio-economic
groups can be empowered to participate in the formal lending system. The rationale is
that if buildings can be produced more cheaply from local materials, overall housing
costs would reduce. Reduced costs of construction would widen the access to loans
for a greater number of people; and the expansion of mortgage lending would
contribute to macroeconomic improvement.
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An Efficient Land Administration System

The future of the mortgage market in Nigeria is also largely dependent on the
development of an effective and efficient land administration system. This is aside
from the strategic objective discussed earlier for developing and improving housing
finance services in the country. A major step taken in 1978 was the enactment of the
Land Use Act. In concept, it was to harmonise and simplify the operation of the land
delivery system. By vesting in government all rights to the use and transfer of title in
land, the intent of government was to ensure that development land would be
available as and when needed in the overall interest of the public good. Besides,
speculative transactions that had artificially inflated land prices in certain parts of the
country were to be curbed. However, administrative bottlenecks in the operation of the
Act have made cumbersome, each stage of any transaction in land.
A well functioning title and lien registry is an important underpinning of both the
primary and secondary market. Without good title, borrowers cannot use their homes,
as effective collateral for loans and investors will not view securities backed by such
loans as safe. A key legal prerequisite is the timely and cost effective registration of
title and lien. A barrier that exists in Nigeria today is the imposition of transfer taxes
and stamp duties on title and lien registration or transfer. Long delays in the
registration process can also increase the risk of both primary and secondary
mortgage markets.
Cost of transfer and documentation of title to land are very expensive. Sometimes, it is
as high as (if not more than) the cost of land. Furthermore, each mortgage transaction
is subject to the consent of the state governor, and the bureaucracy and cost of
procuring this con, ent have been obstacles for many prospective lenders and
borrowers alike. Fgr example, the current charges on a transaction on land in Lagos
State today are as follows:
I

•
•
•
•
•
•

Agency fee
Legal fee
Governor's Consent
Stamp Duty
Capital Gains tax
Registration

1096
1096
1596
396
1096
196

The charges are not lower in most States of the Federation. When all these are added
together on varying land transactions (including mortgages), the parties to such
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ventures are likely to be discouraged thereby resulting in the expansion and growth of
the mortgage market b eing stunted.

